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ABSTRACT 
 
Using micro-data of the Establishment and Enterprise Census, we compile new statistics on 
the employment of Japanese affiliates of foreign firms at the 3-digit industry level for the year 1996. 
We find that the existing official statistics severely underestimate inward FDI. Nevertheless, the 
level of inward FDI in Japan is much lower than that in the United States. The results of our 
regression analyses imply that by eliminating the restrictions on inward FDI and reducing 
government activities, Japan can increase inward FDI in the service sector. Our results also suggest 
that the keiretsu do not act as an impediment to inward FDI. 
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1. Introduction 
According to the standard theory (Caves, 1982; Dunning, 1988), foreign direct investment is 
a form of long-term international capital movement accompanied by investors’ intangible assets, 
such as the stock of technological knowledge accumulated by R&D or the accumulation of 
marketing know-how from past advertising activity. The host country is expected to benefit from the 
inflow of such intangible assets. Especially in the case of the service sector, since many services are 
not tradable, customers in one country cannot enjoy the advanced services of foreign firms, if these 
do not establish affiliates in that country. Being aware of this issue, the Japanese Government has 
lifted its regulations and made efforts to promote inward FDI in recent years.
1 Although FDI in 
Japan is increasing rapidly, the FDI stock in Japan is still very small.   
In spite of the importance of FDI in Japan, Japan’s official statistics on inward FDI have 
many drawbacks in comparison with U.S. statistics as we will discuss in the next section.
2 Probably 
due to the deficiency of data, there are not many empirical investigations on why FDI in Japan is so 
small. In this paper, we compile new statistics on the employment of Japanese affiliates of foreign 
firms (JAFF) in Japan at the 3-digit industry level for the year 1996. Our new statistics are based 
mainly on micro-data of the Establishment and Enterprise Census of Japan, which is conducted by 
the Japan Management and Coordination Agency. Using our statistics, we compare FDI in Japan 
with FDI in the United States at the 3-digit industry level. We also compare FDI in Japan with 
Japan’s outward direct investment and Japan’s international trade in goods and services. 
According to our new statistics, actual foreign activities in Japan are much greater than 
those reported in METI’s (the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, formerly the Ministry of 
                                                  
1 For detail of deregulations and promotion policies, see Japan Investment Council (various years) and 
Japanese Government (various years). 
2  Weinstein (1997) also discusses this issue.   4
International Trade and Industry, MITI) survey, Gaishi-kei Kigyo Doko Chosa (Survey on Trends of 
Business Activities by Japanese Subsidiaries of Foreign Firms). However, we found that foreign 
activities in Japan are substantially smaller than those in the United States. Moreover, compared with 
the U.S., inward FDI in Japan is concentrated in a limited number of industries, such as motor 
vehicles and parts, electric equipment and computers, drugs and medicines, wholesale trade, eating 
and drinking places, retail trade, and financial intermediary services.   
Since our statistics are compiled at the 3-digit industry level, we can use them for 
cross-industry regression. We estimated an empirical model explaining the determinants of Japan’s 
inward FDI penetration. We found that inward FDI penetration is closely related to several 
characteristics of industries. In the manufacturing sector, Japan’s inward FDI penetration is relatively 
high in industries that have a higher research and development intensity, capital intensity, and 
skilled-labor intensity. On the other hand, in the service sector, Japan’s inward FDI penetration is 
relatively high in industries that have a higher market concentration ratio, a lower presence of 
government activities, and a lower presence of official restrictions on inward FDI. We found that the 
presence of keiretsu does not have significant negative effects on FDI penetration.   
The paper is organized as follows: In the succeeding section, we discuss existing data on 
Japan’s international transactions of goods and services through affiliates and explain how we 
compiled our new statistics on JAFF. In section 3, we provide a general overview of FDI in Japan. In 
section 4, we undertake an econometric investigation of the determinants of Japan’s FDI penetration 
at the 3-digit industry level. 
 
2. Existing Data on FDI in Japan and Compilation of the New Statistics 
Probably the most commonly cited statistics on Japan’s inward direct investment are those   5
provided by the Ministry of Finance (MOF, 1999; the data are also available in OECD, 1999).
3 
According to these data, Japan’s outward direct investment stock in the service sector is nine times 
greater than the corresponding inward direct investment stock (Table 1). Since no other OECD 
country has an imbalance of this magnitude, it has been argued that this imbalance indicates the 
closedness of the Japanese economy to inward direct investment in the service industries (GATT, 
1995; MITI, 1998a; Stern, 2000). In the case of the manufacturing sector, the outward direct 
investment stock is six times greater than the corresponding inward direct investment stock. But 
since the MOF data only record cross-border capital flows, they do not necessarily correspond to the 
extent of affiliates’ actual activities. For example, because of Japanese regulations, many foreign 
banks and insurance companies entered the Japanese market by setting up branches rather than 
founding subsidiary companies. This fact makes their investment flows relatively small compared 
with the actual magnitude of their affiliates’ activities measured by sales or employment.   
INSERT TABLE 1 
In the case of inward direct investment, the Gaishi-kei Kigyo Doko Chosa (Survey on Trends 
of Business Activities by Japanese Subsidiaries of Foreign Firms) by the Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry (METI) is the only official source on the sales and employment of foreign firms’ 
Japanese subsidiaries.
 4  The survey is loosely based on the U.S. Department of Commerce’s survey 
of foreign direct investment in the United States, but METI’s survey has the following serious 
drawbacks for the purpose of studies on inward direct investment.   
                                                  
3 Although many previous studies mentioned shortcomings of the MOF data, they used the data for the 
analysis on inward FDI in Japan. For details of the data issues, see, for example, Matsuoka and Rose 
(1994), Kimura (1997), and Weinstein (1997).   
4 METI’s other survey, the Kigyo Katsudo Kihon Chosa (Basic Survey on Business Activities by 
Enterprises), also collects data on JAFF as part of information obtained on Japanese firms. But this 
survey covers only the manufacturing and commerce sectors.     6
 
(i) It is not mandatory and suffers from a low response ratio.
5  
(ii) The survey does not cover subsidiaries in real estate, finance, and insurance. 
(iii) The survey covers only Japanese companies that are more than one-third foreign-owned and 
does not cover branches and other establishments directly owned by foreign firms. 
 
Because of the low response ratio and the exclusion of real estate, finance, and insurance, the 
number of subsidiaries covered by METI’s survey is substantially smaller than that of other surveys 
on foreign subsidiaries conducted by private companies.
6, 7 Using Toyo Keizai’s data as the basic 
statistics for the estimation, Fukao and Ito (2003) estimated sales and employment data for Japanese 
affiliates of foreign firms (JAFF) and foreign affiliates of Japanese firms (FAJF) in service sectors at 
the 3-digit level for the year 1995.
8 Although the coverage is broader, the Toyo Keizai data have 
several shortcomings. Probably the most serious drawback is its coverage and reliability. Toyo 
Keizai conducts its own surveys for this database and uses additional data such as financial reports 
for non-responding firms. But since firms are not obliged by law to report correct information, Toyo 
                                                  
5 In the case of the survey for the 1999 fiscal year, only 56.3% of the questionnaires sent out were 
returned to METI. Moreover, usually not all the questions in the returned questionnaires are answered. 
6 Mainly focusing on manufacturing sectors, Kimura and Baldwin (1996) estimated sales and 
procurements by JAFF and FAJF using the results of METI’s surveys. They did not make adjustments to 
account for these problems. 
7 A private company, Teikoku Data Bank Ltd. also provides the database “Cosmos” which covers 1.1 
million Japanese firms for 1999. In the case of the non-manufacturing sector, the database contains 
information on 1,236 firms which were more than one quarter foreign-owned. Some statistics on these 
firms are available at <www.tdb.co.jp>. 
8 By compiling the Toyo Keizai data for the year 1992, Weinstein (1997) found that the total sales of 
foreign affiliates was over five times larger than the numbers published in the METI survey.   7
Keizai’s data is not perfect in their coverage.
9 
  Compared with METI’s statistics and Toyo Keizai’s data, data collected in the 
Jigyosho-Kigyo Tokei Chosa (Establishment and Enterprise Census of Japan), conducted by the 
Japan Management and Coordination Agency (which is now the Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Public 
Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications) are advantageous in several respects. 
This is the most basic and important survey on Japanese establishments and covers all industries. 
Since it is mandatory, the data are more reliable. The survey collects both data on establishments and 
data on enterprises, and these two sets of data are linked. In the survey, companies are asked what 
percentage of their paid-in capital is owned by foreign firms. Therefore we can compile statistics at 
the establishment level and choose any cut-off ratio.
10 The data also include branches and other 
establishments directly owned by foreign firms. In Table 2, we compare the Establishment and 
Enterprise Census data with METI's statistics and the Toyo Keizai data. Judging by the number of 
                                                  
9 Toyo Keizai data also have the following shortcomings. (i) Industry Classification; in Toyo Keizai’s 
data, information at the establishment level is not available. We need to classify affiliates according to 
their primary industry based on line-of-business. For example, computer makers sometimes supply 
computer-related services. However, the Toyo Keizai data do not allow us to treat their service and 
manufacturing activities separately. (ii) Definition of Nationality; Toyo Keizai adopts multiple criteria in 
the coverage of Japanese subsidiaries. For listed or unlisted but large subsidiaries, the cut-off capital 
participation rate is 20%. For unlisted and small subsidiaries, the cut-off rate is 49%. (iii) Branches and 
Other Establishments Directly Owned by Foreign Firms; in the case of the banking and insurance sector, 
the Toyo Keizai data cover Japanese branches and other establishments directly owned by foreign firms. 
However, the data only partially cover such establishments in other sectors. 
10 Each establishment is asked about its major activity at the 4-digit industry level. If we compiled the 
data at an industry level this detailed, our data on many industries would include less than three JAFF and 
we would be forced to suppress the data for secrecy. For this reason, we compile the data at the 3-digit 
industry level. In the case of manufacturing industries, we basically use the Standard Industry 
Classification for Japan (Management and Coordination Agency, 1993). In the case of 
non-manufacturing industries, we use our own classification (for details, see Fukao and Ito, 2003). For 
details of the data compilation, also see Fukao and Ito (2001) and Ito and Fukao (2001).   8
JAFF and number of workers employed by JAFF, the coverage of the Census data and the Toyo 
Keizai data is much broader than that of METI data in the case of non-manufacturing sectors.   
INSERT TABLE 2 
Although the data collected in this survey are ideal for a compilation of statistics on the 
number of workers employed by all JAFF, such statistics are unfortunately not included in the report 
on this survey. Therefore we compiled micro-data of the survey by ourselves. In spite of the merits 
listed above, the micro-data of the Census have the following shortcomings.
11 
 
(i) Information on Activities 
Data collected in the Establishment and Enterprise Census do not include basic information 
on activities, such as sales and profits. They include information on employment, location, and date 
of establishment. Therefore we measure activities of JAFF by number of workers. 
(ii) Years Covered 
The question on the percentage of paid-in capital owned by foreigners was only added to the 
survey by the Japan Management and Coordination Agency in 1996. The same question was also 
included in their 2001 survey, which is not available yet. So the only available data at present are 
those for 1996. 
(iii) Definition of Nationality 
In the 1996 survey, head offices and independent establishments were asked what percentage 
of their paid-in capital was owned by foreigners. When we set our cut-off capital participation rate at 
10%, our data on JAFF include all the affiliates of which one or several foreigners owned 10% or 
                                                  
11 For about five percent of all establishments, we were not able to link them with any head office 
although they replied that they are neither a head office nor an independent establishment. We treated 
them as Japanese independent establishments. Our estimates on the employment of JAFF probably 
underestimate the actual values because of this problem.   9
more in total. In the case of U.S. statistics on U.S. affiliates owned by foreign firms (USAFF), the 
data include only the affiliates of which a single foreigner owns 10% or more (U.S. Department of 
Commerce, 1995a). Therefore our definition of JAFF (10% foreign-owned or more) is broader than 
the U.S. definition of USAFF. In the case of data on affiliates owned 50% or more by foreign firms, 
there is no such gap between our statistics and U.S. statistics (U.S. Department of Commerce, 
1995b). Both the statistics include all the affiliates of which the ownership of one or several 
foreigners exceeds 50% in total. A substantial amount of stocks issued by Japanese prime firms is 
owned by foreign institutional investors as portfolio investments.
12  When we set our cut-off ratio at 
10%, probably our data will include such portfolio investments. Taking account of this risk, we will 
mainly use the 33.4% or 50% cut-off ratio.
13 
. 
For the U.S.-Japan comparison we prepared Table 3, in which we compared the share of the 
number of workers employed by majority-owned foreign affiliates in the United States and Japan. 
Since the U.S. data are not available at the 3-digit industry level, the U.S.-Japan comparison in Table 
3 is done at the more aggregated industry level.   
INSERT TABLE 3 
In order to compare our data on Japan’s inward FDI with Japan’s outward FDI, we prepared 
data on outward FDI. In the case of the manufacturing sector, we compiled micro-data underlying 
MITI (1998b). In the case of the non-manufacturing sector except the primary sector, we used the 
                                                  
12 According to the Japan National Conference of Stock Exchanges (2001), 11.9% of total market value 
in Japanese stock markets was owned by foreigners on March 31, 1996. On March 31, 2001, this ratio 
was 18.8%. 
13 Data on the number of establishments and the number of workers of foreign-owned affiliates in the 
U.S. and the Japanese economy at the 3-digit industry level have been excluded from this version owing 
to space constraints. Interested readers are referred to Fukao and Ito (2001) and Ito and Fukao (2001) for 
the detailed data.     10
micro-data of Toyo Keizai Shimpo-sha (1996).
14 We should note that compared with the data on 
Japan’s inward FDI, the data on outward FDI are probably smaller than the actual values because of 
the limited coverage of the METI and Toyo Keizai data.
15  In order to compare Japan’s establishment 
transactions with Japan’s cross-border transactions, we also adjusted the data of Japan’s 1995 
Input-Output Tables to our industry classifications. Table 4 compares these data. 
INSERT TABLE 4 
 
3. An Overview of FDI in Japan 
3.1 Characteristics of Inward FDI in Japan 
According to our new statistics, JAFF with 33.4% or more foreign ownership in the 
non-manufacturing sector employed 308,000 workers in 1996, which is nearly five times greater 
than the number reported in MITI (1999). In the case of the manufacturing sector, JAFF with 33.4% 
or more foreign ownership employed 176,000 workers in 1996, which is 1.1 times greater than the 
number reported in MITI (1999). The underestimation of METI’s survey is crucial in the case of the 
service sector (Table 2). 
Table 4 shows the industry composition of workers employed by JAFF (33.4% or more 
foreign-owned). In the case of the manufacturing sector, the top four industries - motor vehicles & 
                                                  
14  For details on this compilation, see Fukao and Ito (2003).     
15 Concerning foreign subsidiaries of Japanese firms, METI conducts the survey Kaigai Jigyo 
Katsudo Doko Chosa (Survey on Trends of Japan’s Business Activities Abroad), which covers 
foreign subsidiaries with more than a 10% Japanese ownership. This survey has similar setbacks as 
METI’s survey on inward direct investment. It suffers from a low response ratio and does not cover 
Japanese-owned subsidiaries in the finance and insurance sector. Compared with these surveys by 
METI, Toyo Keizai’s micro-data, Gaishi-kei Kigyo Soran: CD-ROM-ban (Directory of Japanese 
Subsidiaries Abroad: CD-ROM version) and Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran: CD-ROM-ban 
(Directory of Japanese Subsidiaries Abroad: CD-ROM version) have a substantially broader 
coverage of subsidiaries.     11
parts, electronic parts & devices, electric equipment & computers, and drugs and medicines - 
account for a majority of all the workers employed by JAFF in the manufacturing sector. In the case 
of the service sector, FDI is even more concentrated in a limited number of industries, such as 
wholesale trade, eating and drinking places, retail trade, and computer programming and software. 
Using Table 4, we can compare Japan’s inward FDI with its outward FDI. In the case of the 
service sector (Panel B), the imbalances between the activities of JAFF and those of FAJF are 
smaller than those reported in the MOF FDI statistics. In terms of employment, the JAFF (33.4% or 
more foreign-owned)/FAJF(10% or more foreign-owned) ratio is 0.34 (=0.65/1.89). The MOF 
statistics in Table 1 exaggerate the gap, probably for the following reasons. 
First, during the second half of the 1980s, Japanese firms engaged in a large amount of FDI in 
the tertiary sector, especially in the United States. Stock market and real estate bubbles in Japan 
during this period enabled real estate companies, general construction companies, institutional 
investors and other small investors to borrow large funds to invest in foreign real estate (Wilkins, 
1990; Kenneth Leventhal & Company, 1994). During this period, Japanese firms in the tertiary 
sector, especially banks and general construction companies, also expanded their business in purely 
domestic markets in foreign countries such as retail banking in California or Britain or the 
development of shopping malls in the United States (Wilkins, 1990; Graham and Krugman, 1991). 
Since a substantial part of FDI in the real estate sector was conducted as portfolio investment, 
activities by affiliates measured by sales or employment are relatively small compared with capital 
flows. And although many of Japan’s FDI projects in the tertiary sector resulted in failure afterwards, 
withdrawals of equity investment or repayments of loans or bonds are not subtracted from the MOF 
statistics, which are gross data. These factors exaggerate Japan’s outward FDI in the MOF statistics. 
Second, as we have already pointed out, because of regulations by Japanese authorities, many 
foreign banks and insurance companies entered Japan through setting up branches instead of   12
founding subsidiary companies. This fact makes their investment flows relatively small compared 
with the actual sizes of their affiliates’ activities measured by sales or employment. 
Looking at Japan’s inward and outward FDI in the service sector by detailed industry (Panel 
B of Table 4), outward FDI is concentrated in industries that support Japan’s international business, 
such as casualty and life insurance, transportation, other business services, agricultural services,
16 
financial intermediary services.
17  However, activities of JAFF are much smaller than those of FAJF 
in almost all industries except air transportation. Moreover, we can see from Table 4 that there has 
been a fair amount of international transactions through both FDI and trade some services related to 
goods trade and tourism (such as wholesale trade, financial and insurance services, transportation, 
advertising, information services, and hotels and lodging services). However, international 
transactions are very limited in some services such as utilities, telecommunications and broadcasting, 
education, medical and heath services, and personal services. Most of these sectors are related to 
national security or public health and international transactions are highly regulated.
18 
In the case of the manufacturing sector (Panel A of Table 4), imbalances between the 
activities of JAFF and those of FAJF are greater than those reported in the MOF FDI statistics in 
Table 1. In terms of employment, the JAFF (33.4% or more foreign-owned)/FAJF (10% or more 
foreign-owned) ratio is 0.095 (=1.36/14.29). The very small inward FDI but large outward FDI 
observed in textiles and apparel seems to correspond to Japan’s comparative disadvantages in these 
industries. Outward FDI activity is very strong in electrical machinery and motor vehicles where 
                                                  
16  Japan’s large trading companies (sogo shosha) own several warehouse companies in the U.S. for 
imports of agricultural products. 
17 Among all of Japan’s FDI, investment in these kinds of supporting industries for Japan’s 
international activities has the longest history. Japan’s large trading companies (sogo shosha), banks, 
insurance companies, transportation companies started their FDI before the Second World War. The 
Japanese government sometimes backed up this type of investment. 
18  For Japan’s regulations on inward FDI, see Appendix Tables 1, 2, and 3.   13
most labor-intensive processes are moved to developing countries. In addition, outward FDI in the 
motor vehicle industry was undertaken in order to avoid trade friction with the U.S. and European 
countries. On the other hand, inward FDI is concentrated in industries such as chemicals, drugs and 
medicines, electric and electronics, and motor vehicles, where proximity to consumers plays an 
important role. 
 
3.2 Comparison between Inward FDI in Japan and in the United States 
Next we compare FDI in Japan with FDI in the United States. Using Tables 3 and 4, we can 
compare Japan’s and America’s purchases of goods and services from foreigners. For the service 
sector as a whole, Japan’s ratio of imports to total domestic output is 2.11%, which is almost the 
same level as the corresponding U.S. ratio at 2.07% (Panel B of Table 4). But in the case of inward 
FDI (Table 3), Japan’s ratio of the number of workers employed by majority-owned foreign affiliates 
to the total number of workers is 0.59%, which is less than one fifth of the corresponding U.S. ratio 
of 2.77%. It seems that Japan’s market for services is more closed for establishment transaction than 
for cross-border transactions. 
In the case of the manufacturing sector, Japan’s ratio of the number of workers employed by 
majority-owned foreign affiliates to the total number of workers is 0.79%, which is less than 
one-thirteenth of the corresponding U.S. ratio of 10.48%. Compared with the case of the service 
sector, the gap between FDI in Japan and that in the United States is much larger in the case of the 
manufacturing sector (Table 3). In cases where cross-border transactions in goods and services are 
not difficult, multinational corporations will choose the location where the production costs are 
lowest. Since Japan’s wage rates and land prices are relatively high, Japan probably has a locational 
disadvantage for manufacturing industries except those in which proximity to consumers plays an   14
important role.
19 It is more efficient for multinationals to export their products to Japan from their 
manufacturing affiliates in China and elsewhere. We know that a substantial part of Japan’s FDI in 
U.S. manufacturing industries was the result of U.S. trade barriers, such as “voluntary” restraints on 
car exports and anti-dumping policies on electrical machinery exports from Japan during the 1980s. 
Therefore in the case of the manufacturing sector the low level of inward FDI does not necessarily 
imply the existence of substantial impediments to inward investment and  we cannot argue that 
Japan’s low level of inward FDI itself is problematic.
20  
Compared with the case of the manufacturing sector, the low level of FDI in Japan’s service 
sector is a more serious issue. Since many services are untradable, Japanese customers cannot enjoy 
advanced services of foreign firms if the foreign firms do not establish affiliates in Japan. As already 
mentioned, services related to goods trade such as financial and insurance services and transportation 
services are more likely to be traded by crossing borders. However, as for relatively untradable 
services, customers have to go abroad to buy them or foreign firms establish affiliates to provide 
them. For example, utility services, education, personal supply services, hotels and lodging places, 
and personal services, are less likely to be traded.
21  
Using Table 3, we can compare Japan’s and the United States’ penetration of inward FDI, 
which we measure by the ratio of the number of workers employed by majority-owned foreign 
affiliates to the total number of workers at a detailed industry level. According to Table 3, this ratio 
is higher for Japan than that for the United States in only three industries: finance except depository 
                                                  
19  For more details on this issue, see Brainard (1997) and Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2001). 
20  Eaton and Tamura (1994) pointed out this possibility.     
21 Our data on Japan’s services imports and exports are primarily taken from statistics on Japan’s 
“special trade (cross-border trade)” and “direct purchases” that are included in the 1995 Japan 
Input-Output Tables (Japanese Government, 1999). Large components of the special trade are 
handling charges of financial transactions and payment for goods transportation. Most of the imports 
and exports in the hotels and lodging places sector comes from “direct purchases” by tourists.   15
institutions, computer and data processing services, and other services (such as eating and drinking 
places and individual education facilities). It is also interesting to note that in Japan, differences in 
this ratio among industries are more remarkable than in the United States. Japan’s variation 
coefficient of this ratio among manufacturing industries is 1.43 compared to a variation coefficient 
of only 0.93 for the United States (Table 3). In the case of non-manufacturing industries, Japan’s 
variation coefficient is 1.26 compared to that of 0.74 for the United States (Table 3). In Japan, there 
are what may be labeled ‘sanctuary sectors’, such as medical services, utilities, and education, in 
which almost no foreign affiliate exists (Table 4). Inward FDI is impeded by a lack of market access. 
For example, private corporations which seek profits are prohibited to do business in major areas of 
education and medical services. However, in the U.S., the inward FDI ratios in these sectors are not 
small, which is a conspicuous difference between Japan and the United States.   
 
3.3 Recent Trends of Inward FDI in Japan   
So far, our analysis was static and mainly based on data for 1996. But we should note that 
FDI into Japan is growing at an amazing speed. Table 5 shows MOF statistics on FDI flows into 
Japan. According to the statistics, the inward direct investment stock in Japan’s non-manufacturing 
sector has grown eight-fold in the last ten years. The total of FDI flows in the last three years is 
greater than the FDI stock at the end of the 1996 fiscal year. In recent years, the number of 
cross-border M&A cases has been increasing especially.
22 In 1999, AT&T and British Telecom 
jointly bought a combined 30% share of Nippon Telecom. A British company, Cable & Wireless, 
acquired IDC (International Digital Communications) by a takeover bid. An American company, GE 
Capital acquired Japan Lease. In 2000, an American company, Ripplewood Holdings and others 
acquired The Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan. 
                                                  
22  According to MITI (2000), there were 129 investments into Japan through cross-border M&A in 
1999.   16
INSERT TABLE 5 
Probably the following two factors have contributed to the recent increase in inward FDI. First, 
in recent years, the Japanese government promoted important deregulatory and related measures in 
order to transform Japan’s economic system into one that is more open to the international 
community and based on the rules of self-responsibility and market principles. As a part of this 
deregulation program, the Japanese government relaxed or abolished several regulations on inward 
FDI. For example, all restrictions on foreign ownership and on foreign board members in Type I 
telecommunications carriers (except for NTT and KDD), including their radio station licenses, were 
removed in 1998. In 1999, all restrictions on foreign capital and the appointment of foreign directors 
in all cable TV businesses were ended.
23 Moreover, the recent stagnation of Japan’s land and stock 
prices has created a kind of “fire-sale” situation, from which foreign investors have benefited.
24  
Using Toyo Keizai data, we compared JAFF’s employment in 2000 with that in 1990 (Table 6). 
Table 6 shows changes in the number of workers employed by JAFF and changes in Japan’s imports 
of services. According to Table 6, the number of workers employed by JAFF in the service sector 
has grown by 78%, which is substantially smaller than MOF FDI statistics indicate in Table 5.
25 
According to MOF statistics, inward FDI stocks in the non-manufacturing sectors have grown 
eight-fold from the end of 1990 to the end of 2000. Probably, the MOF statistics exaggerate the 
                                                  
23 For more detail on Japan’s recent deregulation measures, see Japan Investment Council (various 
years). 
24 We can confirm the recent increase in FDI to Japan’s service sector by our micro-data of the 
Establishment and Enterprise Census of Japan. We can see that in the case of the manufacturing 
sector, the majority of 10% or more foreign-owned establishments were started up before 1984. In 
contrast with this, in the case of the service sector, many foreign-owned establishments were started 
up after 1990. However, we should note that in cases of acquisitions and capital participation, the 
date of establishment can be earlier than the date of FDI. 
25 On the other hand, U.S. firms, for example, increased their sales of services through their 
affiliates in Japan by 122% from 1990 to 1997 (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1999).   17
increase of JAFF’s activities in recent years. On the other hand, the number of workers employed by 
JAFF in manufacturing sectors only increased by less than 8% in this period, although the inward 
FDI stocks in the manufacturing sector tripled according to the MOF statistics. This probably 
reflects the fact that Japan has been losing comparative advantages in the labor-intensive 
manufacturing industries.
26  According to Table 6, increases of JAFF’s employment are quite uneven 
among industries. JAFF’s employment in advertising, telecommunications, information services, 
precision instruments, and iron and steel etc. has more than doubled, while that in wholesale trade, 
hotels and lodging places, and many manufacturing industries was relatively stagnant. 
INSERT TABLE 6 
Probably we can partly explain the recent rapid increase in JAFF in the service sector by the 
history of Japan’s regulations on inward FDI.
27 After joining the OECD in 1964, Japan gradually 
and systematically relaxed its regulations on inward FDI. In the case of the manufacturing sector, 
Japan lifted almost all the regulations by 1980 except those on FDI in the petroleum and leather 
product industries (See Appendix Tables 1 and 3). In the cases of many service industries, however, 
Japan continued to restrict inward FDI by foreign exchange law and other regulatory laws until quite 
recently (See Appendix Tables 1 and 2). In particular, inward FDI in life insurance, 
telecommunications, and broadcasting services was highly restricted until the late 1990s. 
 
4. Econometric Analysis of Determinants of FDI in Japan 
As we have seen in the previous section, there are significant differences in inward FDI 
penetration in the various industries and in Japan and the United States. Is Japan more closed to the 
                                                  
26 Fujii and Kimura (2001) analyzed the exit pattern of firms in the Japanese manufacturing sector 
and found that JAFF were more likely to exit from the market.   
27 Japan’s process of inward FDI liberalization and Japan’s remaining major restrictions on inward 
FDI are summarized in Appendix Tables 1, 2 and 3.   18
inward FDI compared with other countries? And, what industry characteristics affect the inward FDI 
penetration of each industry? In this section we conduct an empirical study on this issue. 
 
4.1 Estimation of the Gravity Model 
In order to test whether Japan’s market is more closed for establishment transactions than for 
cross-border transactions, we estimated gravity models both for the direction of U.S. exports and the 
regional distribution of sales by U.S. firms’ foreign affiliates.
28  The results are summarized in Table 
7. The dependent variables are the logarithms of U.S. exports and sales by affiliates. As explanatory 
variable, we use the logarithm of each country’s GDP, the logarithm of per capita GDP, the logarithm 
of distance from the U.S., and a dummy for Japan. In some equations, we add a dummy variable 
which indicates countries where English is one of the predominant languages. The equations are 
estimated for 1992 and 1998 for the manufacturing sector (Panel A) and for 1992 and 1999 for the 
service sector (Panel B). The Japan dummies are not significant both in the U.S. export equations 
and in the sales-by-affiliates equations. Even though we cannot conclude that the Japanese market is 
significantly more closed to sales by U.S. firms than other countries’ markets, the magnitude of the 
coefficient of the Japan dummy is quite large. Moreover, it seems that the signs of the estimated 
coefficients of the Japan dummies are consistent with our findings from the U.S.-Japan comparison 
based on Tables 3 and 4. The coefficients of the Japan dummies take a positive value in the case of 
the export equations and a negative value in the case of equations for sales by affiliates. In the 
service sector (Panel B), the results imply that without controlling for the language factor, Japan’s 
                                                  
28  There are several empirical studies which estimated an econometric model explaining the regional 
distribution of U.S. direct investment abroad and found that a Japan dummy is negative and 
significant. These studies are based either on data of FDI in manufacturing industries (Grubert and 
Mutti, 1991) or on data of FDI in all the industries (Eaton and Tamura, 1994). On this issue, also see 
Lawrence (1993) and Development Bank of Japan (1997).   19
purchases of services through establishment transactions from U.S. firms were about 70% less than 
the predicted value in 1992 and still 50% less than the predicted value in 1999. However, when the 
language factor is controlled for, Japan’s purchase of services through establishment transactions 
from U.S. firms were only about 10% less than the predicted value in 1999. These results confirm 
the recent rapid increase of inward FDI in Japan and also suggest that the Japanese market for 
services is not that closed to inward FDI. On the other hand, in the manufacturing sector (Panel A), 
the absolute value of the coefficient of the Japan dummy in the sales-by-affiliates equations is larger 
than that in the service sector, and is also large even after controlling for the language factor. 
Comparing the size of coefficient of the Japan dummy in the 1998 sales-by-affiliates equation with 
that in the 1992 equations, there is no evidence suggesting that inward FDI in Japan increased 
remarkably during the period. These findings are consistent with the observations discussed in the 
previous section.
29 
INSERT TABLE 7 
 
4.2 Cross-Industry Analysis on Determinants of Inward FDI penetration 
Cross-industry analyses on the determinants of FDI into Japan have been conducted by 
                                                  
29 Although the estimated coefficients on the Japan dummies are not statistically significant, this 
might be the result of specification errors, such as missing variables. In particular, many previous 
studies found that Japan dummies tend to have a significantly negative coefficient for the 
manufacturing sector as we already mentioned in footnote 31. These previous studies mainly use 
FDI flows or assets as dependent variables, while our gravity model regressions use sales by 
affiliates as the dependent variable. This might be one reason why we do not obtain a significantly 
negative coefficient for the Japan dummies. That is, even though there are relatively small numbers 
of affiliates of foreign firms in Japan, sales by these affiliates could be fairly large owing to Japan’s 
larger market scale and higher income. However, in any case, at least we can say from our results 
that there is no strong evidence suggesting that the Japanese market is particularly closed to sales by 
U.S. firms.   20
Lawrence (1993), Weinstein (1996), Nakamura, Fukao, and Shibuya (1995, 1997), Horaguchi (1995), 
and Fukao and Ito (2003).
30 One of the most hotly debated issues in these studies was whether 
Japan’s  keiretsu  relationships impede inward FDI. It has been argued that keiretsu  relationships 
reduce inward FDI through cross share-holdings and long-term supplier relationships. Using MITI 
(1991) data on only ten industries, Lawrence (1993) did a cross-industry regression and found that 
keiretsu relationships significantly impeded inward foreign direct investment. By constructing panel 
data based on MOF data, Weinstein (1996) conducted a similar kind of regression and found that the 
coefficient on the shares of financial group member sales in each sector is negative but not 
significant in many cases. Nakamura, Fukao, and Shibuya (1995, 1997), using their newly compiled 
statistics on Japan’s inward FDI penetration (the share of sales by JAFF in total sales) in 58 
manufacturing industries from micro-data of METI’s Kigyo Katsudo Kihon Chosa (Basic Survey on 
Business Activities by Enterprises) conducted a cross-industry regression. They found that sales 
concentration as measured by the Herfindahl index has significant negative effects on Japan’s inward 
FDI penetration, while capital intensity and skilled-worker intensity have significant positive effects 
on the FDI penetration. They also found that keiretsu variables and a government barrier dummy 
variable based on OECD (various issues) do not have a significant effect on FDI penetration. 
Horaguchi (1995) also found that a coefficient on the keiretsu share was not significant. For the 
Japanese service industries, Fukao and Ito (2003) conducted a cross-industry regression and found 
that the inward FDI penetration is low in industries where government-owned establishments are 
dominant. Moreover, they found that the relatively higher FDI restrictiveness in Japan compared to 
the United States has significantly negative effects on Japan’s inward FDI. In the case of keiretsu 
variables, Fukao and Ito (2003) did not obtain significant results, suggesting that the keiretsu do not 
                                                  
30 In the case of FDI into the U.S., Ray (1989), Kogut and Chang (1991), and Pugel, Kragas, and 
Kimura (1996) conducted similar types of cross-industry analyses.       21
act as an impediment to inward FDI in Japan’s service sector. 
These previous empirical studies have some shortcomings with regard to the databases used in 
the analyses. First, several studies such as Lawrence (1993) are based on a very small sample size. 
Second, although FDI in services is an important issue, except for Fukao and Ito (2003), there is no 
study on FDI in this sector. And third, as we mentioned in Section 2, the data these studies used are 
based on firm-level surveys. Yet, as one firm is often involved in diversified businesses spanning 
different industries, it is more appropriate to use establishment-level surveys to capture the size of 
activities in each detailed industry.   
In this section we estimate an empirical model explaining the determinants of Japan’s inward 
FDI penetration. The variables of this estimation are defined in Table 8. Further details on the 
definitions and sources of the variables are provided in the Appendix. We use Japan’s FDI 
penetration ratio as the dependent variable.
31 Japan’s FDI penetration is defined as Japan’s ratio of 
the number of workers employed by companies that are 10% or more foreign-owned to the total 
number of workers. In addition, taking into account the different attributes of manufacturing and 
service sectors, we assume different models for the estimations of the two sectors. 
INSERT TABLE 8 
The standard theory of FDI (see, for example, Caves, 1982 and Dunning, 1988) emphasizes 
intangible assets, such as the stock of technological knowledge accumulated by R&D or the 
accumulation of marketing know-how from past advertising, as a source of multinational enterprises’ 
advantages. When a firm moves production overseas, it is in a disadvantageous position in relation 
to local firms because of differences in terms of language, customs and institutions. Multinational 
enterprises will exist only if the foreign establishments they control and operate attain lower costs or 
                                                  
31 On the theoretical foundation of cross-industry estimation, see Kogut and Chang (1991), Petri 
(1991), and Lawrence (1993). On the keiretsu, also see Saxonhouse (1993).     22
higher revenue productivity than the same establishments functioning under local management. 
According to this theory, we will observe more active FDI in R&D-intensive or 
advertisement-intensive industries. We would expect positive coefficients for RDINT (R&D 
intensity) and ADINT (advertisement intensity). If Japanese firms’ productivity level is higher than 
that of foreign firms, Japanese firms would have a higher sales share in the world market and inward 
FDI will be limited. To take account of this factor, we used DPROD (an index comparing Japan’s 
productivity in each industry with the U.S. equivalent) which was taken from Kawai (1996). We 
should note that it is problematic to use this variable for the following reasons. First, since Japanese 
firms compete not only with U.S. firms but also with other countries’ firms, DPROD is not an 
appropriate variable. Second, in Kawai’s (1996) methodology, if Japan’s absolute producer price 
level in one industry is higher than the corresponding U.S. price level and if this gap cannot be 
explained by Japan-U.S. differences in factor prices and prices of intermediate inputs, then Japan’s 
productivity in that industry is inferred to be lower compared to the United States. But there is a 
possibility that Japan’s high absolute price level (relatively low DPROD) might reveal either Japan’s 
higher industry rent or Japan’s higher fixed costs. Third, there might exist a reverse causality. High 
inward FDI penetration might increase DPROD through either reducing the industry rent or 
improving that industry’s productivity.   
In cases where cross-border transactions are not difficult, for example due to low transportation 
costs or the characteristics of the services, multinational corporations will choose the location where 
production costs are lowest.
32 Therefore, the inward FDI penetration ratio will be affected by 
Japan’s locational advantage for each industry. Since Japan’s capital prices are relatively low and 
land prices and wages of unskilled workers are relatively high, Japan probably has a locational 
                                                  
32  Brainard (1993, 1997) discusses this issue for the case of manufacturing products. For the issue of 
locational advantage, also see Dunning (1988).       23
advantage for capital-intensive industries and a disadvantage for land-intensive or unskilled 
worker-intensive industries. Consequently, we would expect positive coefficients for CLRATIO 
(capital-labor ratio) and UNIV (skilled-labor intensity), and a negative coefficient for LAND (land 
intensity). Since it is considered that the capital intensity is a more important determinant in the 
manufacturing sector and it is difficult to get reliable data on capital intensity in the case of the 
non-manufacturing sector, we introduce CLRATIO only in the manufacturing sector regressions. It 
has been argued that firm-specific skills play a more important role in Japanese firms and that this 
feature has hindered the development of the secondary labor market in Japan. This fact might 
impede the entry of foreign firms (Weinstein, 1996). In order to take this factor into account, we 
prepared JOBSEP (job separation rate).
33  We expect a positive coefficient for this variable. 
Industrial organization theory, moreover, suggests that new entries are often deterred in an 
oligopolistic market. For example, an incumbent firm often takes strategic actions to deter new 
entries, and entry into an industry may be difficult where the minimum efficient scale is large 
relative to the market size. Therefore, we introduced two variables representing market concentration, 
HERF (Herfindahl index) and CR4 (top 4-firm concentration ratio), and would expect negative 
coefficients for both. 
To find out the effects of government regulation on inward FDI, we prepared the variables 
REGCUR and REGPAST for the manufacturing sector regressions, and RINVJAUS (Japan’s FDI 
restrictiveness minus U.S. FDI restrictiveness) for the service sector regressions. REGCUR is a 
dummy variable which takes one for currently regulated industries, and REGPAST is a dummy 
variable which takes one for industries regulated in the past. To construct RINVJAUS, following 
                                                  
33  Weinstein (1996) used data on wage gaps between JAFF and independent Japanese firms in order 
to test whether Japan’s low liquidity of labor impedes inward FDI. But since this data is only 
available at quite an aggregated level, we do not use it.       24
Hoekman (1996), we compiled a frequency measure for FDI restrictiveness at the 3-digit industry 
level, using data from GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services) schedules for Japan and the 
United States, APEC (1996), OECD (various issues), Japan Investment Council (various years), and 
the Japanese Government (various years).
34 According to these indices, Japan has not been 
welcoming to FDI in the fields of transportation, medicine, postal services, temporary staffing 
services, agriculture-related services, ship repair, and electricity/gas. RINVJAUS is defined as the 
difference between the FDI restrictiveness of Japan and the United States. We expect a negative 
coefficient for this variable. 
Moreover, inward FDI in an industry will be limited, if government-owned establishments 
dominate the industry. To study this effect, we used PUBEMP (the share of workers employed by 
local or central government). We expect a negative coefficient for PUBEMP. 
In order to take account of the effects of the keiretsu, we used two keiretsu variables, HORIZ 
(the share of workers employed by horizontal keiretsu firms) and VERT (the share of workers 
employed by vertical keiretsu firms). If the keiretsu impede inward FDI, we will have negative 
coefficients. In order to control for differences in the tradability of different goods and services, we 
used FDIUS (U.S. inward FDI penetration), though we think that tradability is a more important 
determinant of FDI in the service sector than in the manufacturing sector. We expect a positive 
coefficient for this variable.
35  
                                                  
34 Interested readers are referred to Ito and Fukao (2001) for the FDI restrictiveness indices at the 
3-digit industry level. 
35  In his comment on an earlier version of this paper, Sadao Nagaoka pointed out that market growth 
might be an important determinant of inward FDI. Consequently, we added a new variable, the 
growth rate of domestic demand from 1985 to 1995, which we obtained from Japan's Linked 
Input-Output Tables. The estimated coefficient of this variable was negative but insignificant both 
for the manufacturing and the service sector.  Moreover, inclusion of this variable in our regression 
equations did not substantially change the estimated values and the significance of coefficients on   25
We conduct an ordinary least squares regression for the manufacturing sector and a Tobit 
estimation for the service sector, since there exists a lower bound, zero, for our dependent variable in 
the latter. The results are summarized in Tables 9 and 10. For the manufacturing sector, we integrated 
58 manufacturing industries into 38 industries in order to be consistent with the keiretsu data 
published in Dodwell Marketing Consultants (1995). For the service sector, among our 50 industries, 
we were unable to obtain data for nine industries, namely other insurance services, postal services, 
education, research institutes for natural sciences, research institutes for social sciences and 
humanities, health and hygiene, private non-profit organizations’ services, social insurance and 
welfare, and unclassified services. Therefore, the maximum sample size is 41. 
INSERT TABLE 9 AND TABLE 10 
The determinants of Japan’s inward FDI penetration are very different for the manufacturing 
sector and the service sector. In the manufacturing sector, we found advantages in managerial 
resources and factor intensity to be significant, while policy variables were significant in the service 
sector. 
The results we obtained for the manufacturing sector are as follows: The estimated coefficients 
on RDINT (R&D intensity), UNIV (skilled-labor intensity) and CLRATIO (capital-labor ratio) are 
significantly positive and robust. Consistent with the standard theory of FDI, Japan’s inward FDI 
penetration is relatively high in industries that have a higher R&D intensity, a higher skilled-labor 
intensity, and a higher capital-labor ratio. The coefficient on ADINT (advertisement intensity), 
however, is not significant. The estimated coefficient on LAND (land intensity) was negative as we 
expected but insignificant in most cases. In the case of the market structure variables, the estimated 
coefficient on HERF (Herfindahl index) is insignificant. Contrary to our expectations, the coefficient 
                                                                                                                                                  
other variables. Therefore, we only report the estimated results of the equations without domestic 
demand growth.   26
on JOBSEP (job separation rate) is negative, but insignificantly so. The coefficient of DPROD is 
positive but insignificant. In the case of policy variables, the estimated coefficients on REGCUR (a 
dummy for currently regulated industries) and REGPAST (a dummy for industries regulated in the 
past) are not significant. This result may imply that almost all the regulations in the manufacturing 
sector had already been lifted by 1980 and did not matter in recent years. The estimated coefficients 
on PUBEMP (the share of workers employed by local or central government) are negative and 
significant, as we expected. The estimated coefficients on the two keiretsu variables, HORIZ (the 
share of workers employed by horizontal keiretsu firms) and VERT (the share of workers employed 
by vertical keiretsu firms) are not significant. 
In the service sector, the estimated coefficients of RINVJAUS (Japan’s FDI restrictiveness 
minus U.S. FDI restrictiveness) and PUBEMP (the share of workers employed by local or central 
government) are negative and significant. These results are consistent with the results obtained by 
Fukao and Ito (2003), and imply that by eliminating its restrictions on inward FDI and reducing 
government activities, Japan can increase inward FDI in the service sector. In the case of locational 
advantage variables for the service sector, as we expected, the estimated coefficient on LAND (land 
intensity) is negative while the coefficient on UNIV (skilled-labor intensity) is positive in many cases. 
However, they are not significant. Contrary to our expectations, the coefficient on JOBSEP (job 
separation rate) is negative but insignificant. In the case of the variables that stand for the importance 
of intangible assets, the estimated coefficient on RDINT (R&D intensity) is negative and the 
coefficient on ADINT (advertisement intensity) is positive. But both are not significant in many 
cases. The coefficient on DPROD is positive but insignificant. In the service sector, the estimated 
coefficient on HERF (Herfindahl index) is positive and significant in most cases. One interpretation 
of this result is as follows: the Herfindahl index tends to be higher when economies of scale work at 
the firm level; in such industries we will observe active inward and outward FDI.   27
In the case of the keiretsu variables, we did not get significant results in both the 
manufacturing and the service sectors, which is consistent with the results obtained in most of the 





In this paper we compiled new statistics on the employment of Japanese affiliates of foreign 
firms (JAFF) in Japan at the 3-digit industry level for the year 1996, using micro data of the 
Establishment and Enterprise Census of Japan. According to our new statistics, JAFF with 33.4% or 
more foreign ownership in the service sector employed 308,000 workers in 1996, which is nearly 
five times greater than the number reported in MITI (1999). In the case of the manufacturing sector, 
JAFF with 33.4% or more foreign ownership employed 176,000 workers in 1996, which is 10% 
greater than the number reported in MITI (1999). The underestimation in METI’s survey is 
substantial in the case of the service sector (Table 2). 
Using our statistics, we compared FDI in Japan with FDI in the United States at the 3-digit 
industry level. We found that as of 1996, the share of employment by JAFF in the service sector 
reached one fifth of that of the United States. However, FDI into Japan is growing at an amazing 
speed. The total of FDI flows in the last three years is greater than the FDI stock at the end of the 
1996 fiscal year. If this growth continues, the share of employment by Japanese affiliates of foreign 
firms in the service sector may reach a level almost equal to that observed in the United States. 
In order to examine whether Japan’s inward FDI is significantly lower than in other countries, 
                                                  
36 As Fukunari Kimura and Sadao Nagaoka pointed out, it is difficult to test the effect of 
impediments which cover all industries (such as Japan’s inferior accounting standards) by our 
cross-industry regression.   28
we estimated a gravity model using the data on U.S. exports and sales by U.S. firms’ foreign 
affiliates. Moreover, we also estimated an empirical model to examine the determinants of Japan’s 
inward FDI penetration using our cross-industry statistics. The results of the gravity model showed 
that Japan’s purchases through establishment transactions from U.S. firms tended to be less than the 
predicted value in both the manufacturing and the service sectors, but could not conclude that 
Japan’s market was significantly more closed to sales by U.S. firms than other countries’ markets. 
The results of our cross-industry regression analysis showed that the determinants of Japan’s inward 
FDI penetration were very different for the manufacturing sector and the service sector. In the 
manufacturing sector, we found advantages in managerial resources and factor intensity to be 
significant. In the service sector, policy variables were significant. This result implies that by 
eliminating restrictions on inward FDI and reducing government activities, Japan can increase 
inward FDI in service sector. In the case of the keiretsu variables, we did not obtain significant 
results in both the manufacturing and the service sectors. This suggests that the keiretsu do not work 
as an impediment to inward FDI in Japan. 
We found that compared with FDI in the U.S., FDI in Japan’s service sector is more 
concentrated in a limited number of industries, such as wholesale trade, eating and drinking places, 
retail trade, and computer programming and software. In Japan, there are what may be labeled 
“sanctuary” sectors, such as medical services, utilities, postal services, and education. If international 
competition in these sectors were introduced through the participation of foreign capital, this would 
undoubtedly contribute to Japan’s structural reform process. In order to remove government 
impediments to direct investments by foreign companies, not only should the principle of equal 
treatment irrespective of nationality be applied, but restrictions on market access should be eased. In 
the “sacred” sectors, restrictions on market access, which take precedence over equal treatment, 
impede direct investment by foreign companies. In fact, even Japanese corporations are sometimes   29
prohibited from participating in those markets because of legal restrictions. The very existence of 
public entities also impedes participation by private companies. In order to encourage market 
participation by foreign companies in areas in which government involvement is high, there is a need 
to solve difficult issues such as how to introduce competitive principles without violating the public 
interest.   30
Appendix: Description of Variables and Data Sources 
 
1.    Notes to Table 4 
Imports, Exports, and Domestic Output: 
Our data on Japan’s imports, exports, and total domestic output are taken from the 1995 
Japan Input-Output Tables (Japanese Government, 1999). 
In the context of our analysis, cross-border service trade statistics in Japan’s I-O tables have 
the following shortcomings: 
(i) Imports and exports in I-O tables do not include payments and receipts for construction services 
which, if provided by non-residents, should be considered as service imports. 
(ii) As merchandise imports are on a CIF basis, I-O output tables omit those services - transportation 
and insurance - that are associated with the import of goods and already included in the value of 
goods imports.   
(iii) The value of overseas wholesalers’ activities is included in the value of goods imports either on 
an FOB basis or on a CIF basis, while the value of domestic wholesalers’ activities for exported 
goods is properly summed up in the output of wholesale trade sector. 
In order to solve these problems, we used Bank of Japan (various issues) data on trade in 
construction and civil engineering, water transportation, and air transportation services. For imports 
of wholesale trade services which are included in the value of goods imports, we estimated 
distribution margins in the following way. We calculated the ratio of distribution margins for 
exported goods to total exports on an FOB basis, and estimated margins on imported goods by 
multiplying imports on an FOB basis by the commercial margin ratio. We obtained the value of 
goods imports on an FOB basis from Bank of Japan (various issues). 
In the case of financial intermediary services, we calculated a measure of import quantities   31
which is comparable to our measure of activities for this sector, that is, current income. We derived 
this by multiplying the industry’s import/output ratio of the I-O tables with the industry’s total 
current income. 
Our data on U.S. imports and total domestic output are taken from the 1992 U.S. Input-Output 
Tables (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1995c). Due to the same shortcomings as in the case of 
Japan’s I-O tables, we revised the data of the I-O tables, using data on cross-border transactions of 
U.S. International Services (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1999) for construction and civil 
engineering, railway passenger and freight transportation, road passenger and freight transportation, 
water and air transportation, and supporting services for transport. Data on imports of financial 
intermediary services, telecommunications, eating and drinking places, and hotels and lodging places 
are also taken from U.S. Department of Commerce (1999). For imports of wholesale trade services, 
we estimated distribution margins that are included in the value of goods imports in the same way as 
with Japan’s imports. We should note that imports data in U.S. Department of Commerce (1999) 
exclude imports from U.S. firms’ foreign affiliates. 
 
2.    Notes to Table 8 
Japan’s Inward FDI Penetration (FDIJA):  
The share of the number of workers employed by JAFF (Japanese Affiliates of Foreign 
Firms) that are 10% or more foreign-owned in Japan’s total number of workers in 1996. Our data are 
compiled using the micro-data of the 1996 Establishment and Enterprise Census of Japan.   
R&D Intensity (RDINT): 
RDINT is defined as the ratio of R&D expenses to the gross value-added in each industry. In 
the case of the manufacturing sector, the data are compiled using the industry-level data provided in 
Nakamura, Fukao and Shibuya (1995, 1997). In the case of the service sector, the data are taken   32
from the 1995 Japan I-O Tables (Japanese Government, 1999). R&D expenses are defined as the 
amount of input from the research industry to each industry. 
Advertisement Intensity (ADINT):   
ADINT is defined as the advertising expenses per employee in each industry. In the case of 
the manufacturing sector, the industry-level data provided in Nakamura, Fukao and Shibuya (1995, 
1997) are used. In the case of the service sector, the data are taken from the 1995 Japan I-O Tables 
(Japanese Government, 1999). The advertising expenses are defined as the amount of input from the 
advertising industry to each industry. 
Capital-Labor Ratio (CLRATIO): 
The industry-level data provided in Nakamura, Fukao and Shibuya (1995, 1997) are used. 
Land Intensity (LAND):   
Our data on LAND are taken from the Development Bank of Japan (2000) and Nikkei 
QUICK Information Technology (2000). We first calculated the ratio of the book value (unit: billions 
of yen) of owned land to the number of employees for each firm. LAND is a weighted average of the 
land/employee ratio in each industry. We used the number of employees of each firm as a weight. 
For water supply and sewerage systems industries, we calculated the land/employee ratio using MOF 
(1996). We first regressed the ratio calculated using the Development Bank of Japan’s data on the 
ratio calculated using MOF’s data for the industries that have the ratios calculated by both data. We 
then took the adjusted ratios for water supply and sewerage systems industries by using the 
estimated regression equation. 
Skilled Labor Intensity (UNIV):  
UNIV is defined as the ratio of the number of university graduate employees to the total 
number of employees in that particular industry. The data are taken from Prime Minister's Office 
(1995) and Ministry of Labor (1996).   33
Herfindahl Index (HERF): 
  HERF is calculated from each firm’s share of the number of employees in the total number 
of employees in each industry. The data are complied using the micro-data of the 1996 
Establishment and Enterprise Census of Japan. 
Top 4-Firm Concentration Ratio (CR4): 
CR4 is calculated from each firm’s share of the number of employees in the total number of 
employees in each industry. The data are complied using the micro-data of the 1996 Establishment 
and Enterprise Census of Japan. 
U.S. Inward FDI Penetration (FDIUS): 
The share of the number of workers employed by foreign firms’ U.S. affiliates in the total 
number of workers in the U.S. in 1992. The data are taken from the U.S. Department of Commerce 
(1995a). 
Currently Regulated Industries (REGCUR): 
REGCUR is a dummy variable which takes one for currently regulated industries, otherwise 
zero. According to the information in the OECD’s Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements 
(various years), the currently regulated industries are the petroleum and the leather and leather 
products industries. 
Industries Regulated in the Past (REGPAST): 
REGPAST is a dummy variable which takes one for industries regulated in the past, otherwise 
zero. According to the information in the OECD’s Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements 
(various years), the industries regulated in the past are food and related products, textile products and 
apparel, pharmaceuticals, miscellaneous chemicals, stone, clay, and glass products, special industry 
machinery, electric equipment and computers, and electronic parts and devices industries. 
Differences between Japan’s and U.S. FDI Restrictiveness (RINVJAUS):    34
RINVJAUS is defined as the difference between the FDI restrictiveness of Japan and the United 
States. Following Hoekman (1996), we compiled a frequency measure for FDI restrictiveness at the 
3-digit industry level, using data from GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services) schedules 
for Japan and the United States. The GATS schedule of each country shows to which service sectors 
and under what conditions the basic principles of the GATS - market access and national treatment - 
are applied in that country. The GATS schedule covers 155 service sectors. The commitments and 
limitations are in every case entered with respect to each of the four modes of supply, i.e. 
cross-border supply, consumption abroad, commercial presence, and presence of natural persons. It 
seems that commitments on the commercial presence mode of supply have the most significant 
impact on inward FDI, so we used only information on this mode of supply. For sectors not covered 
by the GATS schedule, we obtained information on each country’s FDI restrictiveness from APEC 
(1996), OECD (various issues), Japan Investment Council (various years), and the Japanese 
Government (various years). Our measure for FDI restrictiveness has been excluded owing to space 
constraints. Interested readers are referred to Ito and Fukao (2001) for the measure.   
Share of Public Services (PUBEMP): 
PUBEMP is defined as the ratio of the number of workers employed by establishments owned 
by the central or local governments to the total number of employees in that particular industry in 
Japan. The data are taken from Management and Coordination Agency (1998). 
Productivity (DPROD):   
DPROD is defined as the productivity of a particular industry in Japan relative to that in the 
United States. The data are based on Kawai (1996). For this data, also see Kawai and Urata (1997). 
Job Separation Rate (JOBSEP):  
The data on JOBSEP are taken from Ministry of Labor (1995). 
Vertical Keiretsu (VERT):    35
VERT is defined as the share of workers employed by vertical keiretsu firms in the total work 
force. In the case of the manufacturing sector, the industry-level data provided in Nakamura, Fukao 
and Shibuya (1995, 1997) are used. In the case of the service sector, the data on keiretsu were taken 
from Toyo Keizai Shimpo-sha (1992, 2000). We treated all the firms that belong to forty-three 
independent corporate groups (Toyota, Nissan, Hitachi, Toshiba, Matsushita, Taisei, etc.) and all the 
subsidiaries of such firms as vertical keiretsu firms. 
Horizontal Keiretsu (HORIZ):  
HORIZ is defined as the share of workers employed by horizontal keiretsu firms in the total 
work force. In the case of the manufacturing sector, the industry-level data provided in Nakamura, 
Fukao and Shibuya (1995, 1997) are used. In the case of the service sector, the data on keiretsu were 
taken from Toyo Keizai Shimpo-sha (1992, 2000). We treated all the firms that belong to the 
Shacho-kai (Presidents’ Clubs) of seven corporate groups (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuyou, 
Sanwa, Ichikan, and Tokai) and all the subsidiaries of such firms as horizontal keiretsu firms.   36
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 Table 1. Japan's Inward and Outward FDI: Position at the End of March 2001
(Billion Yen)
Panel A. Inward FDI Panel B. Outward FDI
Industry Inward FDI Stock Industry Outward FDI Stock
Manufacturing Total 5,324 Manufacturing Total 34,187
Food and related products 110 Food and related products 3,181
Textile products 24 Textile products 1,508
Rubber and leather products  82 Lumber and pulp 994
Chemicals and allied products 1,272 Chemicals and related products 4,478
Petroleum 443 Ferrous and nonferrous metals 3,419
Glass and stone products 30 Machinery 2,858
Primary and fabricated metals 220 Electronics and electrical machinery 9,126
Machinery 2,978 Transportation equipment 4,751
Other manufacturing 165 Other manufacturing 3,873
Non-manufacturing Total 7,880 Non-manufacturing Total 71,665
Construction 21 Agriculture and Forestry 424
Real estate 339 Fishery 257
Commerce 2,028 Mining 5,193
Business and personal services 1,526 Construction 821
Transportation services 48 Commerce 11,016
Communication services 1,155 Finance and Insurance 20,347
Finance and insurance 2,595 Business and Personal Services 11,398
Others 168 Transportation Services 7,862




Note: Cumulated value of FDI flows approved or notified from 1950 onwards.
Sources: MOF (1999) and <www.mof.go.jp>
㐱Table 2. Comparison of Major Statistics on FDI in Japan
METI "Survey on Trends of
Business Activities by Japanese
Subsidiaries of Foreign Firms
Toyo Keizai Shimpo-sha
"Directory of Japanese
Subsidiaries of Foreign Firms"
Annual data are available from
1970
Annual data are available from
1985
Does not cover finance,
insurance, and real estate
Covers all industries
Not-mandatory. Response ratio
for the 1996 Survey was 52.1%
Not mandatory. There is no
information on response ratio
Firm level, 24 industries
(including 5 non-manufacturing
industries)
Firm level, 55 industries
The cut-off ratio is 33.4%
For listed or major firms, the
cut-off ratio is 20%, otherwise
49%
Not covered
Covered in the case of finance
and insurance
March 31, 1996 October, 1998
>10% >33.4% >=50% >=33.4% >=20% or >=49%
Number of Workers Employed by JAFF 2,338 407 248 N.A. 268
Number of Japanese Firms Owned by
Foreign Firms
7 4 4 N.A. 3
Number of Japanese Establishments
Directly Owned by Foreign Firms
66 10 6 N.A. N.A.
Number of Workers Employed by JAFF 1,025,450 176,186 102,155 163,135 286,933
Number of Japanese Firms Owned by
Foreign Firms
600 370 311 480 828
Number of Japanese Establishments
Directly Owned by Foreign Firms
2,714 986 857 N.A. N.A.
Excluding Real Estate and
Finance, including Mining
Number of Workers Employed by JAFF 1,132,702 308,245 279,844 61,961 203,940
Number of Japanese Firms Owned by
Foreign Firms
2,499 2,065 1,887 641 2,456
Number of Japanese Establishments
Directly Owned by Foreign Firms
32,190 12,082 10,699 N.A. N.A.
Detailed information on
business activities is available.
But many firms do not answer
such detailed questions.
Number of workers and start-up
date are available for most





Establishment level, 3-digit industry
classification (Original micro-data is at 4-
digit level)
Our statistics based on micro-data of
"Establishment and Enterprise Census of
Japan"
1996 (Data of the 2001 Survey are not
available yet)
Covers all industries













Date of Survey October 1, 1996
All Other Industries
Cut-off Ratio
Number of workers (in detailed category of
male, female, full-time, part-time etc.), start-
up date, form of ownership, location. No
information on sales or profits.
㐲Table 3.  Number of Employees of Majority-Owned Foreign Affiliates:
                                   U.S. (1992) - Japan (1995) Comparison
Ratio of No. of Workers Employed
by Majority-Owned Foreign




Food and related products 0.28 15.38 201-206
Textile products and apparel  0.14 3.92 207-212
Lumber, wood, furniture, and fixtures 0.02 1.61 213-215
Paper and related products  0.11 5.99 216, 217
Printing and publishing 0.13 6.98 218-220
Miscellaneous plastic products 0.36 3.38 228
Rubber products 1.08 32.30 229, 230
Stone, clay, and glass products 0.16 20.84 232-234
Chemicals and related products 4.24 47.89 221-225
Primary and fabricated metals 0.35 9.37 235-240
General industrial machinery 0.98 9.97 241, 242, 244
Electronic and electrical equipment 1.36 18.87 245-247, 249, 250
Office and computing machines 3.86 12.06 243, 248
Motor vehicles and equipment  0.34 6.70 251
Other transport equipment 0.64 3.29 252
Instruments and related products 0.40 11.54 253-256
Construction 0.05 1.05 301
Wholesale trade 2.19 6.66 308
Retail trade 0.21 3.26 309
Finance, except depository institutions 1.40 1.21 310
Real estate 0.02 2.79 314
Transportation 0.49 2.17 315-321
Services 0.60 2.06
Hotels and other lodging places  0.09 7.27 345
Computer and data processing services  1.63 1.41 332, 333
Motion pictures, including television tape and film 0.13 3.82 343
Health services 0.00 0.71 328, 329
Business services 0.45 3.21 331,334-342
Other services 1.03 0.49 344, 346, 347
Non-Manufacturing except primary industry 0.59 2.77
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 0.08 1.75 348, 102, 103
Mining 0.13 5.55 104
All Industries 0.61 4.61
Note: For the Fukao-Ito classification code, see Table IV and also refer to Ito and Fukao (2001).
Sources: Compiled from micro-data of the Establishment and Enterprise Census for 1996 and
         U.S. Department of Commerce (1995b)
Fukao-Ito Industry
Classification Code
㐳Table 4.  Japan's International Transactions : FDI vs. Cross-Border Trade
<Panel A> Manufacturing Sector
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
201-204 Food products 0.11 12.19 5.03 0.48 10.46 5.21
205 Beverages & tobacco 1.91 4.90 6.28 0.37 8.99 5.37
206 Prepared feed & fertilizers 0.16 0.89 6.51 0.08 10.06 0.96
207 Reeling plants & spinning mills 0.01 23.62 73.25 4.17 8.57 3.94
208 Woven & knit fabrics mills 0.00 13.59 18.73 26.21 4.40 12.66
209 Dyed & finished textiles 0.13 0.00 9.41 0.00 6.32 12.66
210 Other textile mill products 0.04 12.77 12.40 10.19 12.55 13.28
211, 212 Textile outer garments & apparel 0.20 27.83 7.48 0.62 2.75 54.97
213, 214 Sawmills & wood 0.00 22.54 2.32 0.16 2.26 10.98
215 Furniture & fixtures 0.06 6.59 0.66 1.00 3.71 12.74
216 Pulp & paper mills 0.02 8.19 8.28 2.74 9.23 14.00
217 Paper products 0.16 1.18 2.68 1.46 6.95 2.46
218-220 Publishing & printing 0.13 0.74 1.07 0.36 6.56 1.81
221 Industrial inorganic chemicals 3.66 9.58 16.58 1.11 22.79 13.24
222 Industrial organic chemicals 3.55 9.10 22.54 17.55 36.49 13.24
223 Oil products & detergents 1.96 4.44 61.86 3.36 19.23 4.65
224 Drugs & medicines 7.21 7.28 10.04 2.15 33.30 21.17
225 Toilet preparations & others 4.83 11.44 31.36 19.45 20.32 6.33
226 Petroleum refining 12.27 12.00 5.26 2.82 26.79 8.53
227 Petroleum & coal products 0.99 2.53 0.10 2.89 17.81 0.65
228 Plastic products 0.41 1.99 3.91 3.31 10.41 10.58
229 Tires & inner tubes 4.03 6.43 226.60 27.98 51.07 22.71
230 Rubber & plastic footwear 0.46 10.10 5.44 7.77 13.36 10.58
231 Leather products & fur skins 0.00 55.48 2.95 2.70 5.29 134.45
232 Glass & its products 1.24 5.60 43.99 10.70 22.13 12.01
233 Cement & its products 0.00 0.20 1.59 0.83 19.39 2.12
234 Clay, pottery & stone products 0.20 6.28 9.07 8.30 18.07 27.94
235 Blast furnace & basic steel 0.02 3.46 20.03 9.18 23.86 17.96
236 Iron & steel foundries 0.00 0.43 27.75 0.34 9.97 5.72
237 Nonferrous metals 4.37 108.04 16.81 7.42 19.01 20.01
238 Nonferrous rolling & castings 0.96 4.60 12.35 9.72 14.03 7.09
239 Fabricated structural metal 0.27 0.64 0.66 0.37 6.30 1.26
240 Miscellaneous metal work 0.35 2.78 2.74 5.00 7.65 9.38
241 Metal working machinery 0.97 2.42 8.17 24.90 6.85 34.66
242 Special industry machinery 2.16 5.19 13.65 27.14 16.18 19.40
243 Office & household machines 4.31 2.95 10.65 16.42 13.11 18.79
244 General industrial machinery 0.98 3.42 4.61 18.84 9.36 16.32
245 Electrical industrial machinery 1.38 6.12 6.82 22.79 17.03 18.53
246 Household electric appliances 0.52 3.19 147.76 5.01 20.10 82.65
247 Communication equipment  0.68 3.56 36.60 24.44 19.26 12.31
248 Electric equipment & computers 7.94 15.74 5.71 28.43 9.24 53.50
249 Electronic parts & devices 2.11 9.60 27.11 31.26 12.65 28.92
250 Miscellaneous electric equipment 3.13 7.57 31.52 24.80 13.36 31.19
251 Motor vehicles & parts 4.72 3.19 42.05 20.64 11.74 34.24
252 Miscellaneous transport equipment 4.56 9.12 6.02 28.02 3.43 11.48
253, 256 Miscellaneous precision instruments 0.65 14.65 7.43 17.13 13.99 16.78
254 Optical instruments & lenses 0.11 12.77 22.71 41.40 14.27 33.06
255 Watches, clocks & parts 0.00 42.62 30.77 40.75 14.23 360.39
257 Ordnance & accessories 0.00 8.07 0.00 0.13 12.36 3.64
258 Miscellaneous manufacturing 0.60 34.73 6.41 10.36 8.68 57.72





























Sources: Compiled from micro-data of the Establishment and Enterprise Census for 1996, MITI (1998b), and U.S. Department of
Commerce (1995a). Also see Appendix.
Note:  FAJF: Foreign Affiliates of Japanese Firms (10% or more Japanese-owned),  JAFF: Japanese Affiliates of Foreign Firms (33.4% or














㐴Table 4.  Japan's International Transactions : FDI vs. Cross-Border Trade
--- Continued ---
<Panel B> Service Sector
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
301 Construction and civil engineering 0.05 0.34 0.70 0.70 1.97 0.04
302 Electricity 0.02 0.00 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.36
303 Gas supply 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.01 0.67 0.00
304 Steam and hot water supply 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.98 0.00
305 Water supply 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.11 8.69 0.00
306 Sewerage systems  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 8.69 0.00
307 Sanitary services 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 6.98 0.00
308 Wholesale trade 2.31 3.32 5.85 4.87 8.37 9.45
309 Retail trade 0.29 0.03 0.66 0.05 3.79 0.00
310 Financial intermediary services 1.47 2.98 13.37 1.78 6.62 0.25
311 Life insurance 1.46 2.60 3.28 0.09 14.34 0.49
312 Casualty insurance 3.97 1.87 18.41 2.41 14.34 0.49
313 Other insurance services 0.18 n.a. n.a. n.a. 14.34 0.49
314 Real estate 0.02 0.01 1.38 0.01 1.97 0.00
315 Railway transportion 0.00 1.30 0.01 0.30 0.00 3.63
316 Road passenger transportion 0.00 1.26 0.01 0.21 6.75 4.10
317 Road freight transportion 0.05 0.00 0.27 0.03 1.92 0.77
318 Water transportation 1.42 20.96 17.34 19.53 8.34 48.85
319 Air transportation 17.26 46.36 12.61 14.23 12.02 8.16
320 Storage facility services 0.41 0.00 5.18 0.01 1.92 0.77
321 Supporting services for transport 1.02 18.78 4.34 16.72 8.71 18.71
322 Postal service 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.00
323 Telecommunications 0.22 0.68 0.19 0.39 0.37 3.36
324 Broadcasting 0.21 0.00 0.52 0.00 1.28 0.00
325 Education 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.44 0.84
326 Research institutes (natural sciences) 2.95 1.71 0.00 1.14 6.44 0.84
327 Research institutes (soc. sci. & humanities) 0.00 2.15 0.00 1.25 6.44 0.84
328 Medical services 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 2.72 0.00
329 Health and hygiene 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.00 2.72 0.00
330 Private non-profit organization services 0.00 0.84 0.00 1.01 0.00 0.00
331 Advertising 1.20 4.85 3.23 1.47 7.55 0.44
332 Computer programming & software 1.97 1.42 1.02 0.66 4.08 0.18
333 Information services 1.63 6.77 40.74 3.33 4.08 0.18
334 Goods & equipment rental & leasing 0.95 2.33 3.65 1.06 5.36 0.00
335 Automobile renting 0.34 0.00 1.76 0.00 5.67 0.00
336 Automobile repairing 0.12 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.64 0.01
337 Machine repairing 2.23 0.00 0.49 0.00 2.88 0.00
338 Building maintenance services 0.01 0.00 0.23 0.00 7.85 0.00
339 Legal & accounting services 0.00 5.87 0.01 2.18 0.06 0.25
340 Civil eng. & construct. services 0.07 3.11 0.01 2.45 1.44 0.50
341 Personnel supply services 1.19 0.00 0.12 0.01 6.79 1.67
342 Other business services 0.67 3.02 2.98 2.10 4.10 0.45
343 Amusement & recreation services 0.13 1.62 0.52 0.20 4.32 0.24
344 Eating and drinking places 1.58 4.17 0.55 0.56 2.71 2.05
345 Hotels and lodging places 0.20 23.31 4.46 3.97 9.99 19.63
346 Individual education facilities 0.23 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.94 0.00
347 Other personal services 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.01 1.27 0.04
348 Agricultural services 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.82 0.10
349 Social insurance & welfare 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 n.a. n.a.
350 Unclassified services 0.01 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.






































Note:  FAJF: Foreign Affiliates of Japanese Firms (10% or more Japanese-owned),  JAFF: Japanese Affiliates of Foreign Firms (33.4% or more




Sources: Compiled from micro-data of the Establishment and Enterprise Census for 1996, Toyo Keizai Shimpo-sha (1996), and U.S. Department
of Commerce (1995a). Also see Appendix.
㐵Table 5. FDI Flows into Japan (Billion Yen)
1950-90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 Total
Manufacturing Total 1,666.5 257.7 208.1 183.6 205.4 141.2 311.1 267.4 312.6 979.7 790.7 5,324.0
Food and related products 44.2 17.1 1.2 10.4 3.2 4.1 0.3 2.2 25.8 1.5 0.0 110.0
Textile products 9.8 1.3 0.7 0.7 0.1 2.3 0.9 1.9 3.6 0.2 2.4 23.8
Rubber and leather products  11.0 7.6 9.6 5.4 4.0 2.1 10.7 18.8 4.8 7.0 1.1 82.1
Chemicals and allied products 447.3 122.6 93.1 54.2 23.4 109.5 69.5 74.0 39.7 60.3 178.8 1,272.5
Petroleum 102.1 23.4 5.9 5.9 14.7 2.0 8.2 5.8 8.4 13.5 253.4 443.3
Glass and stone products 20.7 0.6 - 0.5 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.7 - 5.7 0.0 30.0
Primary and fabricated metals 91.6 10.7 5.2 17.7 19.6 0.1 52.8 0.3 2.0 17.9 1.9 219.6
Machinery 874.5 59.5 82.9 78.1 133.9 18.2 155.8 145.2 212.9 865.2 351.9 2,978.1
Other manufacturing 65.3 14.9 9.4 10.8 4.8 2.9 12.9 18.5 15.3 8.5 1.2 164.5
Non-manufacturing Total 942.7 331.9 322.5 175.0 227.3 228.4 459.5 410.8 1,027.8 1,419.6 2,334.4 7,880.0
Construction 12.9 3.1 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.3 1.4 2.2 0.0 20.5
Real Estate 115.8 9.4 30.7 10.7 3.2 1.6 26.5 48.2 41.6 16.8 34.6 339.0
Commerce 416.6 107.3 155.4 100.5 113.5 67.9 166.4 99.6 175.9 348.5 276.1 2,027.8
Business and Personal Services 150.3 73.7 106.7 24.0 37.4 49.1 236.0 88.8 318.1 205.8 236.5 1,526.4
Transportation Services 19.8 3.5 2.5 5.1 0.8 1.2 1.0 0.4 6.1 2.2 5.7 48.3
Communication Services 20.8 13.6 6.3 3.2 3.0 5.3 2.1 3.3 16.8 330.0 750.8 1,155.1
Finance and Insurance 96.4 120.3 19.0 4.0 68.7 100.1 27.3 161.6 456.9 511.5 1,029.3 2,595.2
Others 110.4 1.1 1.8 27.4 0.3 3.2 0.2 8.7 11.1 2.5 1.3 168.0
Total Amount 2,608.5 589.6 530.6 358.6 432.7 369.7 770.7 678.2 1,340.4 2,399.3 3,125.1 13,203.3
Note: FDI flows approved or notified from 1950 onwards.
Data Sources: MOF (1999) and <www.mof.go.jp>
Fiscal Year




Growth Rate of No. of
Workers Employed by
JAFF: 1990-2000
Real Growth Rate of
Imports: 1990-1995
Industry (persons) (%) (%)
Agriculture 251 63.0 -1.9
Mining 57 n.a. (2) 16.9
Manufacturing 338,433 7.7 29.9
Food products 7,493 -6.1 35.9
Textile & apparel 4,114 53.5 58.4
Wood products 0 -100.0 30.1
Pulp & paper products 1,348 -23.6 29.5
Publishing & printing 1,292 40.6 -12.7
Chemical products 33,832 -27.5 5.4
Drugs & medicines 37,472 33.4 30.5
Petroleum & coal products 5,029 -54.5 -15.3
Plastic products 1,383 -14.9 111.4
Rubber & leather 13,121 538.2 39.0
Glass & pottery products 2,199 -45.8 -6.3
Iron & steel 65 983.3 14.8
Metal products 1,545 -80.3 19.2
Non-metal Products 1,861 -77.5 7.2
Machinery 19,411 -24.7 -3.7
Electric equipment 67,627 -31.1 129.1
Motor vehicles & parts 110,544 116.0 31.7
Miscellaneous transp. equip. 746 -42.3 -28.4
Precision instruments 23,453 305.3 41.3
Miscellaneous manufacturing 5,898 -35.5 -8.0
Services and others 267,114 77.8 6.8
Construction 1,502 -27.4 n.a. (1)
Wholesale trade 77,750 2.9 -49.5
Retail trade 13,578 557.5 -92.6
Finance 32,239 61.6 14.7
Insurance 33,440 179.4 260.3
Real estate 389 357.6 -54.6
Eat. & drink. places 10,341 95.8 8.3
Advertising 5,933 218.3 6.9
Electricity 0 n.a. (1) -87.6
Gas & steam supply  0 -100.0 33.1
Watersupply 0 n.a. (1) -38.2
Sanitary services 2 n.a. (2) n.a. (1)
Transportation 11,825 143.8 25.5
Support. serv. for transp. 4,760 152.7 13.0
Telecommunications 8,421 933.3 49.4
Broadcasting 473 n.a. (2) -100.0
Research institutes 70 -75.3 73.3
Medical & health services 390 129.4 -23.8
Private non-profit org. serv. 6 n.a. (2) 37.9
Information services 37,752 231.8 38.3
Goods & equip. rental 4,126 1,012.1 82.8
Other business serv. 20,132 234.1 30.4
Amusement & rec. serv. 1,084 74.3 -32.6
Hotels & lodg. places 1,538 -4.1 0.3
Oth. personal services 1,363 -56.9 -7.2
Not classified 0 -100.0 -33.4
Total 605,855 30.4 20.7
Note: The data on JAFF partially cover Japanese branches and other establishments directly owned by
   foreign firms.
    n.a. (1) -- not available due to zero values for both years
    n.a. (2) -- not available due to a zero value for the starting year
Sources: Toyo Keizai Shimpo-sha (various years) and Japanese Government (2000)
㐷Table 7.   Determinants of U.S. Cross-Border Sales and Sales by Foreign Affiliates of U.S. Firms:
Cross Country Estimation Based on Gravity Models
<Panel A> Manufacturing Sector
Year 1992 Year 1998
ln (EX92) ln (EX92) ln (OFDI92) ln (OFDI92) ln (EX98) ln (EX98) ln (OFDI98) ln (OFDI98)
ln (GDP92) 0.447 0.448 1.202 1.213
(4.19)*** (4.17)*** (4.26)*** (4.92)***
ln (GDPPC92) -0.059 -0.054 -0.008 0.160
(-0.56) (-0.50) (-0.03) (0.62)
ln (GDP98) 0.444 0.450 0.862 0.912
(3.86)*** (3.89)*** (5.36)*** (6.00)***
ln (GDPPC98) -0.082 -0.085 0.319 0.332
(-0.71) (-0.73) (1.91)* (2.12)**
ln (DIST) -0.364 -0.452 -0.267 -1.191 -0.391 -0.519 -0.401 -0.801
(-1.22) (-1.34) (-0.45) (-1.96)* (-1.28) (-1.50) (-1.04) (-2.01)*
DJPN 1.372 1.458 -1.819 -1.030 1.257 1.389 -1.569 -1.211
(1.25) (1.31) (-1.09) (-0.70) (1.12) (1.22) (-1.22) (-1.00)
LANG 0.188 1.721 0.274 0.981
(0.57) (2.95)*** (0.80) (2.42)***
_cons 14.295 14.916 -20.157 -14.388 15.142 16.047 -12.724 -10.938
(5.08)*** (4.92)*** (-2.46)** (-1.94)* (5.12)*** (5.05)*** (-2.85)*** (2.57)**
No. of Obs. 58 58 30 30 56 56 40 40
F 8.96*** 7.15*** 7.85*** 9.97*** 7.64*** 6.19*** 12.57*** 12.61***
Adj. R-squared 0.359 0.350 0.486 0.607 0.326 0.321 0.543 0.598
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses.
*P=.10,  **P=.05,  ***P=.01
Definition of variables:
  EX92: U.S. cross-border sales of goods in 1992.
  OFDI92: Sales by foreign manufacturing affiliates of U.S. firms in 1992.
  EX98: U.S. Cross-border sales of goods in 1998.
  OFDI98: Sales by foreign manufacturing affiliates of U.S. Firms in 1998.
  GDP92: 1992 nominal GDP in U.S. dollars.
  GDPPC92: 1992 nominal GDP per capita in U.S. dollars.
  GDP98: 1998 nominal GDP in U.S. dollars.
GDPPC98: 1998 Nominal GDP per capita in U.S. dollars.
㐸Table 7.   Determinants of U.S. Cross-Border Sales and Sales by Foreign Affiliates of U.S. Firms:
Cross Country Estimation Based on Gravity Models   --- Continued ---
<Panel B> Service Sector
Year 1992 Year 1999
ln (EX92) ln (EX92) ln (OFDI92) ln (OFDI92) ln (EX99) ln (EX99) ln (OFDI99) ln (OFDI99)
ln (GDP92) 0.558 0.560 0.654 0.660
(5.28)*** (5.56)*** (2.70)** (2.75)**
ln (GDPPC92) 0.178 0.198 0.733 0.769
(2.18)** (2.52)** (3.39)*** (3.55)***
ln (GDP99) 0.567 0.568 0.564 0.614
(6.33)*** (6.92)*** (3.89)*** (5.26)***
ln (GDPPC99) 0.214 0.230 0.630 0.658
(3.15)*** (3.67)*** (5.39)** (7.01)**
ln (DIST) -0.446 -0.645 0.350 0.150 -0.381 -0.570 -0.414 -0.879
(-1.75)* (-2.44)** (0.48) (0.20) (-1.89)* (-2.85)*** (-1.28) (-3.03)***
DJPN 0.711 0.898 -0.698 -0.482 0.291 0.478 -0.484 -0.120
(1.09) (1.43) (-0.57) (-0.39) (0.56) (0.99) (-0.60) (-0.18)
LANG 0.419 0.496 0.398 0.911
(1.93)* (1.16) (2.43)** (3.50)***
_cons 9.421 10.821 -5.698 -4.575 8.659 10.037 5.402 7.589
(2.21)** (2.62)** (-0.49) (-0.39) (2.41)** (3.01)*** (0.95) (1.66)
No. of Obs. 32 32 25 25 31 31 25 25
F 21.23*** 19.43*** 11.36*** 9.52*** 28.97*** 28.75*** 18.44*** 25.47***
Adj. R-squared 0.723 0.748 0.633 0.640 0.789 0.822 0.744 0.836
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses.
*P=.10,  **P=.05,  ***P=.01
Definition of variables:
  EX92: U.S. cross-border sales of services in 1992.
  OFDI92: Sales of services by foreign affiliates of U.S. firms in 1992.
  EX99: U.S. Cross-border sales of services in 1999.
  OFDI99: Sales of services by foreign affiliates of U.S. Firms in 1999.
  GDP92: 1992 nominal GDP in U.S. dollars.
  GDPPC92: 1992 nominal GDP per capita in U.S. dollars.
  GDP99: 1999 nominal GDP in U.S. dollars.
GDPPC99: 1999 Nominal GDP per capita in U.S. dollars.
㐹Table 8. Definition of Variables for Analysis of Inward FDI Penetration
Dependent Variable:
Japan's Inward FDI Penetration:
FDIJA Share of workers employed by 10% or more foreign-owned
JAFF in Japan's total workers: 1996
Independent Variables: [Expected Sign of Coefficients]
Advantages in Managerial Resources:
RDINT R&D intensity: Ratio of R&D expenses to the gross value-
added: 1995
[+]




CLRATIO Capital-Labor Ratio: Tangible Fixed Assets per employee:
1992
[+]
LAND Land intensity: Land input (book value) per employee:
Industry average: 1995
[-]




HERF Herfindahl Index calculated from share of number of
employees: 1996
[-]
CR4 The top 4-firm concentration ratio calculated from share of
number of employees: 1996
[-]
U.S. Inward FDI Penetration
FDIUS Share of workers employed by foreign firms' U.S. affiliates in
U.S. total workers: 1992
[+]
FDI Restrictiveness:
REGCUR A dummy that takes 1 for currently regulated industries     [-]
REGPAST A dummy that takes 1 for industries regulated in the past     [-/+]




PUBEMP Share of workers employed by local or central governments in
Japan's total workers: 1996
[-]
Productivity:
DPROD Japan's productivity level (United States = 1): 1990 [-/+]
Labor Market Structure:
JOBSEP Job separation rate:1995 [+]
Keiretsu:
VERT Share of workers employed by vertical Keiretsu firms in total
workers: 1998
[-]
HORIZ Share of workers employed by horizontal Keiretsu firms in
total workers: 1998
[-]
Note: For more detailed definitions and sources of the variables, see Appendix.
㔰Table 9. Determinants of Japan's Inward FDI Penetration in the Manufacturing Sector: OLS Estimation with Robust Standard Errors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
RDINT 89.67 86.03 84.18 89.37 76.02 91.29 88.90 94.16 89.51
(3.58) *** (3.21) *** (2.90) *** (3.53) *** (2.80) *** (3.60) *** (3.41) *** (3.66) *** (3.35) ***
ADINT -4.62 -4.68 -4.90 -4.30 -4.67 -4.25 -4.65 -4.21 -4.67
(-1.41) (-1.45) (-1.29) (-1.24) (-1.43) (-1.39) (-1.36) (-1.35) (-1.33)
CLRATIO 0.28 0.27 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.28 0.29
(2.29) ** (2.27) ** (2.46) ** (2.23) ** (2.19) ** (2.35) ** (2.18) ** (2.29) ** (2.05) *
LAND -0.23 -0.25 -0.24 -0.23 -0.24 -0.18 -0.22 -0.18 -0.22
(-1.61) (-1.68) (-1.66) (-1.59) (-1.70) * (-1.50) (-1.59) (-1.44) (-1.56)
UNIV 47.99 47.85 43.74 44.85 57.39 49.17 47.84 51.04 48.42
(2.88) *** (2.90) *** (2.42) ** (2.51) ** (3.28) *** (2.81) *** (2.76) ** (2.62) ** (2.61) **
HERF 0.48 4.78 -1.24 0.15 -14.63 1.08 -3.58 5.58



















_cons -4.66 -4.91 -6.72 -2.76 -4.83 -5.11 -4.66 -5.27 -4.65
(-2.35) ** (-2.56) ** (-2.56) ** (-0.75) (-2.54) ** (-2.57) ** (-2.21) ** (-2.46) ** (-2.15) **
No. of obs 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
F 19.16 *** 18.75 *** 14.16 *** 17.49 *** 19.03 *** 25.29 *** 13.85 *** 20.45 *** 11.92 ***
Adj R2 0.635 0.636 0.643 0.636 0.659 0.646 0.635 0.647 0.635
Note:  1) The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on the Huber-White-Sandwich robust standard errors.
         2)  *P=.10, **P=.05, ***P=.01   (two-tailed test)
Japan's Inward FDI Penetration
(Dependent Variable: FDIJA)
㔱Table 10. Determinants of Japan's Inward FDI Penetration in the Service Sector: 
Tobit Estimation with Robust Standard Errors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RDINT -277.11 -153.40 -247.10 -287.04 -511.82 -325.76
(-1.26) (-1.06) (-1.16) (-1.30) (-1.79) * (-1.40)
ADINT 1.53 0.19 1.38 1.54 2.21 2.04
(1.40) (0.30) (1.30) (1.42) (1.33) (1.67) *
UNIV 1.96 1.45 1.94 1.93 -0.22 1.79
(0.39) (0.29) (0.40) (0.38) (-0.05) (0.35)
LAND -17.71 -12.37 -26.50 -17.04 -18.36 -20.24
(-0.82) (-0.44) (-1.08) (-0.82) (-1.39) (-1.04)
HERF 30.88 27.08 31.68 26.91 36.66







PUBEMP -0.12 -0.04 -0.12 -0.12 -0.05 -0.12







FDIUS 0.81 0.67 0.80 0.81 0.31 0.72
(1.80) * (1.74) * (1.76) * (1.80) * (1.28) (1.60)
_cons -1.80 -3.37 -2.95 -1.35 -1.95 -1.23
(-0.87) (-1.25) (-1.35) (-0.45) (-1.36) (-0.59)
No. of obs 41 41 41 41 41 41
Wald 14.75 ** 13.17 * 20.95 *** 14.68 * 31.60 *** 16.77 **
Log likelihood -119.97 -118.952 -119.614 -119.956 -111.334 -119.265
Note:  1) The numbers in parentheses are z-statistics based on the Huber-White-Sandwich robust standard errors.
3)  *P=.10, **P=.05, ***P=.01   (two-tailed test)
2)  The following nine industries are excluded from the estimations due to the unavailability of some variables: other
insurance services, postal services, education, research institutes (natural sciences), research institutes (social
sciences and humanities), health and hygiene, private non-profit organizations' services, social insurance and welfare,
and unclassified services.
Japan's Inward FDI Penetration
(Dependent Variable: FDIJA10)

























Liberalization of the 17 industries with a time limit  (From Dec. 1974 to May 1976)   (*6)
Retail Trade Liberalization (June 1975)
Amendments to the Foreign Exchange Law (Dec. 1980)
Amendments to the Foreign Exchange Law (Jan. 1992)
Amendments to the Foreign Exchange Law (April 1998)
Notes: (*1) "Person" means any person, any government or its representative, and any foreign juridical
               person or association.
         (*2) other than the excepted industries
         (*3) All industries other than "100% liberalized industries" and  7 industries to which individual 
               screenings are applied.
              "100% liberalized industries" are the industries in which 100% foreign participation in the share
              capital is automatically approved
         (*4) The excepted 5 industries are: 1. Agriculture, forestry and fishery; 2. Oil; 3. Mining;
               4. Leather and leather products manufacturing; and 5. Retail trade
         (*5) For all industries other than the excepted 5 industries and 17 industries with a time limit
               100% foreign ownership is allowed if the firm agrees. In other cases, the foreign ownership
               restrictions are same as before
         (*6) The liberalization dates for the 17 industries with a time limit are as follows: 
Year
Dec. 1974 Integrated circuits
May 1975
Dec. 1975 Manufacture of computers, Sales and leasing of computers
April 1976 Information service industry
May 1976 Fruit juice, Sensitive materials for photography 
         (*7) The specified 11 companies, such as Hitachi and Arabian Oil. 
Sources: Nakamura, Fukao, and Shibuya (1997) Table 9; APEC(1999)
(*3) 228 - less than 10%
less than 25%
(*2)
Inward FDI  is now subject, in general, to ex post facto reporting or, in certain cases, prior
notification to the Minister of Finance and the related Ministers in order to determine if an
inquiry is necessary. An ex post facto report is required to be submitted within 15 days after
the investment is made.
447 77 524 up to 7%
less than 25%
(*2)
Inward FDI  is not subject to prior permission, but in general, to  prior notification to the
Minister of Finance and the related Ministers in order to determine if an inquiry is necessary.
The amendments abolished the condition that takeovers by foreigners require the agreement
with the owners of acquired firms.
Discontinuance of Foreign Participation Restriction for the Designated Companies  (July 1984)   (*7)
up to 20%   (*2)
33 17 50 up to 7%
160 17 204 up to 7%
Meat products, Tomato processed products, Prepared feed for animals,
Pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals, Ferroalloy, Music records,
Real estate, Electronic precision machinery, Packing machinery, Oil
pressure instruments, Apparel (including wholesale trade), Prepared food
products for food service industry
Industries
For Newly Established Firms For Existing Firms
In principle,  100% liberalized with the exception of 22
industries (excepted 5 industries and 17 industries with
a time limit)  (*4)
(*5)
Telecommunications and media industries changed from prior to ex post notification.
Foreign Ownership Number of Industries 
up to 20%   (*2)
㔳Table A.2  Major Restrictions on Inward FDI in Japan
Sector Prohibition, Limitation, or Special Conditions




 2) approvals as program-supplying broadcasters.
Mining
Insurance
Sources: APEC (1999); Japan Investment Council (various years); 
            Nakamura, Fukao, and Shibuya (1997) Table 11.
Apart from the regulations written in the Foreign Exchange Law, certain other laws, such as the following
restrict FDI in Japan:
  a juridical person or association with less than a third of voting rights controlled by
foreigners.
Transport of goods and passengers between Japanese ports is reserved to Japanese ships.
Foreign ownership of Japanese ships can only occur through an enterprise incorporated
in Japan in accordance with the Ship Law.
Foreign participation in the share capital of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone
corporation (NTT) is restricted to less than one-fifth.
The limitations on foreign capital paticipation (formerly limited to less than a third)
in all Type I telecommunications carriers (except for NTT and KDD) were abolished
in February 1998.
The limitation on foreign capital participation in KDD was eliminated in July 1998.
Foreigners or foreign-controlled enterprises (where any of the officers executing the
business is a foreigner, or 20% or more of whose voting rights in aggregate are owned
by foreigners) are not granted:
  1) licenses for broadcasting stations including AM, FM or television broadcasting
stations; and
(The bills which prohibited the granting of permissions to foreigners for the installation
of cable television facilities were removed in June, 1999.)
No one other than Japanese citizens or a Japanese juridical person shall become a
mining right owner.
Japan has no performance requirement or regulation tied in any way to the export
orientation of an investment proposal under the Foreign Exchange Law.
Foreign insurers are required in all cases to lodge an initial deposit for the establishment
of branches which is essentially equivalent to the share capital required of domestic
companies. Initial deposits may be required of national insurers in some cases.
㔴Table A.3 Reservations to the OECD Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements:  
Year Japan United States
1973 Agriculture, forestry and fisheries
Mining
Petroleum
Leather and leather products
Retail Trade
1982 Agriculture, forestry and fisheries
Mining
Petroleum
Leather and leather products 
1993 Agriculture, forestry and fisheries Atomic energy
Mining Broadcasting (radio and television)
Petroleum Air transport
Leather and leather products Coastal and domestic shipping
Air transport, Maritime transport
Investment trust management business 
Fishing in the "Exclusive Economic Zone"
Deepwater ports
1997 Agriculture, forestry and fisheries Atomic energy
Mining Broadcasting (radio and television)
Petroleum Air transport
Leather and leather products Coastal and domestic shipping
Air transport, Maritime transport
Investment trust management business 
Fishing in the "Exclusive Economic Zone"
Deepwater ports
Sources: Nakamura, Fukao, and Shibuya (1997), Table 12.
            OECD, Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements , various years.
Ocean thermal energy, Hydroelectric power, Geothermal
steam or related resources on federal lands, Mining on
federal lands or on the outer continental shelf or on the deep
seabed
Ocean thermal energy, Hydroelectric power, Geothermal
steam or related resources on federal lands, Mining on
federal lands or on the outer continental shelf or on the deep
seabed
U.S. - Japan Comparison
Fresh water shipping, Domestic radio communications,
Domestic air transport
Coastal shipping, Hydro-electric power production, Other
forms of communications, Utilization and production of
atomic energy Integrated circuits, Meat products, Tomato processed
products, Prepared feed for animals, Pharmaceuticals and
agricultural chemicals, Ferroalloy, Music records
Real estate, Electronic precision machinery, Packing
machinery, Oil pressure instruments, Apparel (including
wholesale trade), Prepared food products for food service
industry
Fresh water shipping, Domestic radio communications,
Domestic air transport
Coastal shipping, Hydro-electric power production, Other
forms of communications, Utilization and production of
atomic energy
Manufacture of computers, Sales and leasing of computers,
Information service industry, Fruit juice, Sensitive materials
for photography
Sectors related to national security or public health*
Sectors related to national security or public health* Sectors related to national security or public health*
Sectors related to national security or public health*
*   Under the OECD Code, members are not prevented from taking action in certain sectors, for reasons such as the protection of
their essential security interests. That is, a reservation to the Code is not necessary for those sectors. In accordance with the April
1984 decision, however, such measures as controls imposed for reasons of national security or public health are now examined by
the Committee. As a result, some items of reservations related to those reasons are added to the Code in 1990s.
Sectors related to national security or public health* Sectors related to national security or public health*
Sectors related to national security or public health* Sectors related to national security or public health*
㔵